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Despite the advantages of intermediation, it is a belief that the trade-off is reduced competition for 
securities and places unfair risk and cost onto the ultimate investor. The main positive positions of 
this response to this Call for Evidence1 are: 1) everyone should be enabled to purchase the legal title 
in the shares, rather than the current position of being disabled; and 2) a specific legislative remedy 
needs to be considered for investors against intermediaries and possibly the company as issuer to 
improve the certainty of the law and reduce transaction costs in dealing with the practicalities of the 
intermediated securities chain. A tentative suggestion is also made to consider complete reform to, 
and carving out of, retail investor law with a specific statutory enactment.   
It is anticipated that such proposals would not undermine the current system of intermediation but 
work in conjunction with it. The advantages of the intermediation system would still drive people to 
that system but would enable investors with a sufficient risk appetite to purchase or own the shares 
directly. A more competitive market would, hopefully, reduce the administrative costs involved in 
purchasing shares directly. A specific statutory remedy for ultimate investors who suffer loss or 
wrongdoing would not make corporate law “unworkable”2 but would seek to provide a limited and 
defined solution, particularly where the FSCS or FCA provisions do not cover the loss. This would 
reduce any reliance on common law rules and equitable principles to fill gaps in protection and 
resolve such cases that may otherwise result in a haphazard development of the law and increase 
the transaction costs in intermediated securities for the benefit of all parties. 
The main negative position of this response is that it does not consider that improving the way 
voting rights can be fed back to shareholders will have any positive impact on governance. Instead 
consideration should be given to the way intermediated securities are marketed, acquired, held, and 
disposed of as a way of improving the transparency and understanding of what is being, and has 
been, purchased and the risk investors face by doing so. This should have a knock on effect for the 
improvement of governance by enabling ultimate investors to determine where their money is 
invested. 
I shall now take each question in turn. 
 
Question 1 
Do you consider that it is difficult for ultimate investors to exercise their voting rights? 
If so: 
(1) Do you have examples, or specific evidence, of difficulties experienced by ultimate investors in 
exercising their voting rights? 
(2) What could be done to solve these problems? 
Yes, it is difficult. The example of In the matter of Public Joint-Stock Company Commercial Bank 
“Privatbank”3 demonstrates the transaction costs involved in “enfranchising” the ultimate investor 
                                                             
1 Hereinafter ‘the Call’ 
2 Enviroco Ltd v Farstad Supply A/S [2011] 2 BCLC 165 at [38] 
3 [2015] EWHC 3299 (Ch), [2015] 11 WLUK 345 
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that make it difficult and costly. However, from the outset I should note that that response to this 
question should not be taken as implying it should be easier.  
Example of terms 
The following two examples demonstrate the legal and practical limitations faced by investors in 
obtaining or exercising any voting rights: Freetrade Ltd and Wealthify Ltd. The legal difficulties can 
be seen in the example of Freetrade through the following condition in their agreement with the 
investor: 
The Custodian that holds Securities that you have acquired through our Services will have legal title 
to those Securities and will hold those Securities in its name – in other words, the Custodian’s name 
will appear on all registers, etc. that show who the owner of those Securities is. However, you will be 
the beneficial owner of those Securities – in other words, as between you, us and the Custodian, you 
are the ultimate owner of those Securities. 
A person who holds Securities may from time to time be invited to cast votes in relation to the 
company whose Securities those are, attend meetings of those companies, subscribe for additional 
Securities and/or to take other actions, all on account of the fact that that person is a holder of those 
Securities. These are sometimes referred to as “corporate actions”. The registered holder of those 
Securities will be informed of these corporate actions (i.e. the Custodian in this case). You hereby: (i) 
acknowledge and agree that we will have no duty to inform you of any corporate actions related to 
any Securities that are beneficially owned by you through our Services, even if we become aware 
thereof, (ii) irrevocably waive your right to exercise any corporate actions that may be exercised by 
the holder of the Securities that you beneficially own through our Service, and (iii) agree that the 
Custodian may in its discretion act on those corporate actions as it sees fit.4 
The legal limitation here of obtaining voting rights is clear. There is no right for the ultimate investor 
to exercise such rights because they have contracted away any such ability. 
Now take the example of Wealthify, which demonstrates practical and legal limitations. The terms 
and conditions of their Custodian Bank, Winterflood, provide: 
Clause 4.8: On request and in accordance with Applicable Law, we will arrange for you to attend 
shareholders’, securities holders or unit holders’ meetings in respect of your investments. We can 
also arrange for you to vote and receive any information issued to shareholders, securities holders or 
unit holders, but only upon the prior and timely receipt of an instruction by you, or by a 
Representative on your behalf, to do so. 
While this, in theory, offers better ability as an investor to exercise governance rights, it contains 
several problems. First, the right to vote is buried in the terms and conditions. These rights are not, 
as far as I can see, otherwise advertised to the ultimate investor at the time of opening an account 
with the company. Second, the term stated in Winterflood’s terms and conditions places the burden 
on the investor to exercise any voting rights. The investor has to discover which companies their 
money is invested in, when meetings are being held, and must cover the costs involved in exercising 
the vote. Providers can often lack transparency on where money is invested.5 Ultimate investors may 
                                                             
4 Freetrade Terms and Condition, ‘Your Securities’ available at <https://freetrade.io/terms-conditions> last 
accessed 04/11/2019 
5 See, for example, Friends of the Earth, ‘What’s your pension funding? How UK institutional investors finance 
the global land grab’ <https://friendsoftheearth.uk/sites/default/files/downloads/whats-your-pension-
funding-how-uk-institutional-investors-finance-global-land.pdf> last accessed 11/10/19, p 4 – reporting 4 out 
of the top 10 pension funds provided no public information on the companies that their funds invest in 
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simply not look where the money is invested.6 Just like standard form contracts where it is irrational 
to read them in most instances, it becomes irrational or inefficient to exercise voting rights because 
of the effort required to exercise them.  
Finally, a legal limitation to the exercise of voting rights is that while the ultimate investor is given 
the opportunity to vote, they are only entitled to exercise rights as if they were the member but 
does not confer enforceable rights of a member upon them. If there were any issues regarding the 
exercise of the vote, the investor would have to rely on the intermediary to enforce those rights.7  
Solving the “problem”: Corporate law and governance and the normative consensus 
In regard to what can be done to “solve these problems”, the question implies a normative position. 
It implies that difficulty in voting is a “problem” and implies a normative solution that granting 
shareholders and investors better access to voting rights is a good thing or a solution.  
The Call itself highlights the advantages of intermediation and do not need to be reiterated here.8 
While the normative consensus of corporate law and governance is to maximise the wealth of the 
company, the literature is by no means settled on what a ‘shareholder-centric model’ of corporate 
law and governance should look like. The normative assumption in the question is that the end 
investor knows their self-interest best and should be granted better access to, or more, voting rights. 
But the normative position of corporate law and governance does not always correspond with the 
interests of investors. This has been true even of the first companies. The English East India 
Company shareholders were described as subscribing to no lofty principles, where their 
“expectations of a quick and handsome profit were tempered only by their acute anxiety to keep the 
expenses of eastern trade to a minimum”.9 People do not become more selfless as they are given 
more powers.10 The opposite may very well be true.  Powers may well be exercised selfishly and not 
for the collective value.11 Since ultimate investors may well be retail investors, it is unlikely that 
feeding them voting rights would have any meaningful benefit. Despite a survey of retail investors 
saying 7 out of 10 would like to voice their concerns,12 they are unlikely to exercise rights and, if they 
do, particularly for retail investors, it is unlikely to be on an informed basis that may undermine the 
corporate purpose.  
Alternatively, intermediaries do have the knowledge and incentive to question and read the relevant 
documents relating to the companies. Dividing the labour up in this way may be a more efficient 
shareholder centric model than enfranchising the ultimate investor by law13 or contract. Fund 
managers can bring much more information, understanding and experience to analyse corporate 
documentation, which a retail investor could or would not. They also have the incentive to maximise 
the fund and duties as trustee in doing so. However, the company also has interests that extend 
beyond the immediate interests of retail investors, such as sustainability, climate change, future 
profits, employee retention and so on, that are unlikely to be reflected by the interests of retail 
                                                             
6 See, for example, BBC Money Box podcast, ‘Can my money help fight climate change’ first aired 9th October 
2019 
7 Companies Act 2006, s 145; see also, Eckerle v Wickeder Westfalenstahl GmbH [2013] 3 WLR 1316 at [26] 
8 Para 1.37 
9 J Keay, The Honourable Company: A History Of The English East India Company (Harper Collins Publishers, 
1993) 25 
10 S Bainbridge, ‘The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights’ (2006) 53 UCLA Law Review 601 
11 For a summary see, D Gibbs-Kneller and C Ogbonnaya, ‘Empirical analysis of the statutory derivative claim: 
de facto application and the sine quibus non’ (2019) 19(2) Journal of Corporate Law Studies 303, 305-308 
12 The Share Centre Customer Survey 2014 
13 i.e. through the implementation of the Shareholder Rights Directive II 2017/828/EU 
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investors but can be and are in the fund manager’s. The incurable “narrowness of soul, which makes 
[people] prefer the present to the remote”14 is applicable to retail investors as much as it is to 
anyone else. Enfranchising retail investors who do not have to consider the more remote issue 
relevant to the company might produce negative externalities.  
Enforcement: The derivative claim 
Even if one were to accept that governance would be improved if investors could exercise more 
rights, an additional problem in achieving that aim is enforcement. Currently the investor would 
have no enforcement rights by virtue of the Companies Act 2006, s 145(4). The investor has no 
recourse against the company qua member. Also, as the facts of Eckerle demonstrated, the conduct 
of the intermediary may bar the intermediary from pursuing the company to remedy any loss or 
wrongdoing on the investor’s behalf. However, if retail investors were in some way enfranchised 
under the current rules, enforcement would still be difficult due to obstacles in current enforcement 
mechanisms, particularly the statutory derivative claim. 
If we presuppose ultimate investors can enforce rights, any enforcement action is likely to relate to 
the conduct of directors.15 Therefore, the mechanism they would have to utilise would be the 
statutory derivative procedure set out in the Companies Act 2006, Part 11.16 The problem with 
relying on this procedure, as two recent papers show,17 is that de facto implementation of that 
statutory procedure by the judiciary imposes legal and practical obstacles to a point where only the 
most obvious cases are successful. Given that shareholders struggle to overcome these obstacles, 
the research acknowledges that individuals not traditionally caught by the derivative procedure are 
even less likely to be successful, i.e. beneficial interest holders.18 
To summarise these obstacles, the court imposes what one of the papers identifies as the “sine 
quibus non”19 for the courts to grant a shareholder permission to continue to sue derivatively.  Those 
conditions are: 1) the claim must be in the interest of the company, which is synonymous with the 
claim’s legal merits reaching a high threshold; and 2) there is no principle that could be invoked to 
dismiss the claim, which are generalised as the claimant must be the “proper person”20 to enforce 
the company’s rights. Since an ultimate investor does not, or may not, have access to the relevant 
corporate information, demonstrating any potential wrongdoing has sufficient legal merit to meet 
the conditions imposed by the court is going to be very difficult.21 Even with access to the 
                                                             
14 D Hume, Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, ed P H Nidditch (OUP 3rd ed, 1988) 252-56 
15 At least in relation to more serious matters affecting corporate value, rather than more trivial residual 
matters relating to things such as the recognition of individual votes 
16 Or possibly under the old equitable procedure, see, Re Fort Gilkicker Ltd [2013] EWHC 348 – where the old 
procedure survived for double derivative claims. Retail investors are not party to the company constitution, so 
would have no rights by virtue of Companies Act 2006, s 33, unless the statute was amended to extend the 
meaning of member, which seems unlikely to happen 
17 D Gibbs-Kneller and D Gindis, ‘De jure Convergence, de facto Divergence: A comparison of factual 
implementation of shareholder derivative suit enforcement in the United States and the United Kingdom’ 
(2019) 19(6) European Business Law Review 909-330 forthcoming; D Gibbs-Kneller and C Ogbonnaya, 
‘Empirical analysis of the statutory derivative claim: de facto application and the sine quibus non’ (2019) 19(2) 
Journal of Corporate Law Studies 303 
18 D Gibbs-Kneller and C Ogbonnaya, ‘Empirical analysis of the statutory derivative claim: de facto application 
and the sine quibus non’ (2019) 19(2) Journal of Corporate Law Studies 303, 329-31 
19 Essential conditions 
20 D Gibbs-Kneller and C Ogbonnaya, ‘Empirical analysis of the statutory derivative claim: de facto application 
and the sine quibus non’ (2019) 19(2) Journal of Corporate Law Studies 303, 310 
21 For rules relating to shareholder access to corporate information see, The Companies (Model Articles) 
Regulations 2008 No 3229, Sch I, Art. 50 (Ltd); Sch III, Art. 83 (plc) – Except as provided by law or authorised by 
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information they may lack the expertise to appraise the information received. This point highlights 
the problem with the normative assumption in the question posed by the Call. Most retail investors 
simply lack the expertise to know how to exercise or remedy their rights. By comparison, the 
intermediary, however, does, or can have, the incentive and obligation to maximise the value of the 
fund and is, perhaps, best placed to exercise rights and remedies, in what is a sensible and efficient 
division of (beneficial) ownership and control of shares.  
Even if the investor could overcome the first condition of the court, it is unlikely that the company 
could not establish a principle to have the claim dismissed under the second condition. One example 
of a principle that could be invoked by the company against an ultimate investor is an absence of 
wrongdoer control. In the absence of wrongdoer control, the proper person to litigate would be the 
members of the company. While this is no longer a bar to a claim, as was the position under the 
previous equitable procedure,22 this sine qua non requires there to be no reason to dismiss a claim. 
Roth J noted ‘a claim that lies in a company can be pursued only by the company’ and an absence of 
wrongdoer control means the company may not be deprived of its rights of enforcement.23  
It is unlikely those with a beneficial interest could overcome this condition. Courts have generally set 
their face against developing exceptions to who can enforce the company’s rights. In Prudential 
Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No 2) the court stated that they should not be: 
Pioneering a method of controlling companies in the public interest without involving regulation by a 
statutory body … voluntary regulation of companies is a matter for the City. The compulsory 
regulation of companies is a matter for Parliament.24 
Mozley v Alston noted being liberal may open the floodgates ‘as many different bills might be filed as 
there were shareholders in a company, all praying different things’.25 The courts, generally, are also 
reluctant to interfere with matters of internal management. Disputes normally arise out of business 
matters, which courts are less apt at dealing with than business persons, Carlen v Drury ‘[t]his court 
is not to be required on every occasion to take the management of every playhouse and brewhouse 
in the Kingdom’.26 Therefore, anyone outside the scope of the equitable procedure is still likely to be 
prevented from accessing permission to sue under the statutory procedure.  
Another principle that may be utilised is independent views. Independent directors and members’ 
views may be solicited at any time. It is unlikely those views would support litigation and a claim 
would be dismissed.27 Faced with these risks, a beneficial interest holder is unlikely to pursue 
derivative proceedings due to the risk of cost liability under English rule.28 Existing and recent 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
the directors or an ordinary resolution of the company, no person is entitled to inspect any of the company’s 
accounting or other records or documents merely by virtue of being a member/shareholder; Civil Procedure 
Rules 31.16, 31.6 
22 Those claims heard under the exception to Foss v Harbottle (1843) Hare 461; and Civil Procedure Rules 19.9 
23 Cinematic Finance Ltd v Ryder [2010] EWHC 3387 (Ch) at [11], [21]; [2012] BCC 797; see also, Bridge v Daley 
[2015] EWHC 2121 (Ch) at [55]–[57], [68]; cf Stainer v Lee [2010] EWHC 1539 (Ch); [2011] BCC 134 at [16], [49] 
24 [1982] Ch. 204, 224 
25 (1847) 1 Ph 790, 799; 41 ER 833, 837 
26 (1812) 1 Ves & Bea 154, 157; 35 ER 61, 62 
27 See, for example, Bridge v Daley [2015] EWHC 2121 at [56]; Kleanthous v Paphitis [2011] EWHC 2287 (Ch); 
(2011) 108(36) LSG 19 at [75], [83]; D Gibbs-Kneller and D Gindis, ‘De jure Convergence, de facto Divergence: A 
comparison of factual implementation of shareholder derivative suit enforcement in the United States and the 
United Kingdom’ (2019) 19(6) European Business Law Review 909-330 forthcoming 
28 Civil Procedure Rules, 44.3(2)(a); see also Wallis v Duke of Portland 3 Ves. Jun. 494 per Lord Loughborough 
regarding justifications for such a rule; cf. Martell v Consett Iron Co Ltd [1955] Ch 363, 399-400 
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reforms to civil litigation funding are also very unlikely to reduce that risk and incentivise derivative 
litigation.29 
Reframing the “problem” to improve governance 
The question could be reframed to consider how intermediaries may be empowered to better 
represent the interests of individual investors, as opposed to taking collective decisions. However, in 
regard to improving the investor’s position and indirectly the governance of companies, focus should 
be given instead to making it easier for them to know where their money is invested. This will enable 
them to instruct the intermediary to move it should it be invested in a company that the ultimate 
investor does not want it to be. This should not only include moving money in a fund to another 
company, but moving the whole investment out of the fund to another fund platform.  
Shareholders, legal and beneficial, are likely to follow the ‘path of least resistance’.30 For beneficial 
shareholders, that path is voting with their money, not their hand in general meeting or trying to 
enforce rights, as the above shows. Compulsory and regulatory measures need to be considered that 
enable shareholders to dispose of their investment from firms where they no longer wish to invest 
in.31 For example, periodic disclosure of investment holdings to ultimate investors. Currently, there is 
too much emphasis on, and too many obstacles in front of, the ultimate investor to discover where 
funds are invested. Albeit the market is producing platforms, such as Fund Eco Market and Ethical 
Investment Association, which enable ultimate investors to make investment decisions that align to 
their interests. But even these still place the burden on the investor and do not provide periodic 
disclosure on investments once the securities have been acquired. 
Placing even more burden on them, that question 1 seems to be implying, by giving them better 
access to voting rights is unlikely to have the intended consequence of improved governance. While 
the decision of where to invest does and should require some decision making to be made by the 
ultimate investor, there needs to be more initial and periodic transparency on where that money is 
going to enable the ultimate investor to make decisions. This needs to be coupled with a suitably 
regulatory system on labelling of funds with appropriate kite marks to avoid obscuring where money 
is invested. There are many different options out there for the ultimate investor, such as ethical, 
impact, climate and sustainable funds, and green or blue bonds but these labels do not necessarily 
reflect the reasonable expectations of ultimate investors. While the industry has produced some 
level of certification of these funds, such as green bonds, their meaning may not be fully 
transparent. For example, China has issued green bonds to finance coal powered power stations.32 
No reasonable investor would expect a green bond to have been invested in such a way. Another 
example from ShareAction is that while Fund Managers may advertise certain credentials, such as on 
climate action, there are several instances where they block positive climate votes.33 
                                                             
29 See, D Gibbs-Kneller and D Gindis, ‘De jure Convergence, de facto Divergence: A comparison of factual 
implementation of shareholder derivative suit enforcement in the United States and the United Kingdom’ 
(2019) 19(6) European Business Law Review 909-330 forthcoming 
30 M Gelter, ‘Why Do Shareholder Derivative Suits Remain Rare in Continental Europe’ (2012) 37 Brooklyn 
Journal of International Law 843, 870 
31 This may be coupled with the statutory remedy proposed in question 8 below and considered further in 
question 25 
32 Reuters, ‘China coal-fired power plant issues green bonds’ 04/08/17 <https://uk.reuters.com/article/china-
power-financing-idUKL4N1KP3RQ> last accessed 11/10/19 
33 ShareAction, US investors are too cosy with companies on climate crisis, miles behind Europe, 4th Nov 2019 
<https://shareaction.org/us-investors-are-too-cosy-with-companies-on-climate-crisis-miles-behind-europe/> 





Are there particular systems or models of holding intermediated securities which could better 
facilitate the passing back of direct rights for ultimate investors? 
If so, what are the current obstacles to the use of such systems? 
See above. Again, there is a normative implication in this question that passing back of direct rights 
will have a positive effect on the governance of the company. That is by no means certain if those 
rights are not exercised to achieve the corporate purpose. What does need to be done is enabling 
investors to purchase the legal title to shares, discussed below, and the facility to move investments, 
as discussed above and in question 25. 
 
Question 3 
Do you consider that the type of vote affects the extent to which ultimate investors can exercise 
voting rights? 
If so, do you have examples, or specific evidence, of this issue? 
While I have not exercised votes through my investments held by intermediaries before, I would 
probably be more inclined to vote on matters clearly relating to the share value. For example, I 
would more likely vote on matters regarding takeovers and re-registering from public to private, but 
accounting and audit matters less likely. Remuneration would fall somewhere in the middle. 
I have exercised my vote through a building society before. I voted in favour of all except one 
resolution. Those I voted in favour of I did so because I lacked time and information to assess the 
resolutions. I did vote against an independent director’s reappointment however, since they had 
been on the board for more than 10 years. The resolution still passed overwhelmingly.  
 
Question 4 
Do you consider that it is difficult for ultimate investors to obtain confirmation that their votes 
have been received and/or counted? 
If so: 
(1) What is the impact of this? 
(2) Do you have examples, or specific evidence, of difficulties experienced by ultimate investors in 
confirming that their votes have been received and/or counted? 






Do you consider that the rules and practical arrangements relating to the timing of voting affect 
the ability of ultimate investors to vote? 
If so: 
(1) Do you have examples, or specific evidence, of these problems? 
(2) What could be done to solve these problems? 
I would agree that this appears to be a problem. As the example of Wealthify above shows, the 
practical burdens make it difficult to exercise a vote. In light of the Commission’s point about record 
dates, this seems to compound the issue.  
 
Question 6 
Do you consider that there are aspects of proxy voting which may affect the rights of ultimate 
investors in the context of an intermediated securities chain? 
If so: 
(1) Do you have examples, or specific evidence, of these problems? 
(2) What could be done to solve these problems? 
No additional comment. See points about enforcement and CA 2006, s 145(4) above. 
 
Question 7 
Do you consider that the headcount test in section 899 of the Companies Act 2006 has the 
potential to cause problems in the context of intermediated securities? In what way? 
If so: 
(1) Do you have examples, or specific evidence, of problems arising out of the application of 
section 899 of the Companies Act 2006 to intermediated securities? 
(2) What could be done to solve these problems? 
I thought that this was a specific example of the more general problem of intermediaries 
representing a variety of interests in any given resolution. As such, schemes of arrangement have 
the potential to cause “problems” as much as any other decision involving a headcount of 
shareholders. If the proxy/intermediary can only vote once when representing 20,000 people’s 
interests that causes problems for the investor and the proxy as intermediary. However, one could 
imagine the practical difficulties of an alternative system that enabled the intermediary to be 
counted 20,000 times in the headcount. However, members do have a statutory right to demand a 
poll.34 The Act provides that any article that excludes the right to demand a poll is void. How a poll 
vote may be demanded is left to the Articles.35 The chair is also under a duty to demand a poll when 
                                                             
34 Companies Act 2006, s 321 
35 The Companies (Model Articles) Regulations 2008/3229, Art 44 (ltd); Art 36 (plc) 
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they have a real sense that a poll would produce a different result.36 Since a proxy as intermediary 
can exercise their 20,000 votes, assuming that they hold 20,000 shares, in a poll any which way they 
choose or are instructed to do so,37 a solution may already be available.  
 
Question 8 
Do you consider that, in practice, the no look through principle may restrict the rights of ultimate 
investors who wish to bring an action against an issuing company or intermediary? 
If so: 
(1) Do you have examples, or specific evidence, of problems caused by the no look through 
principle? 
(2) What could be done to solve these problems? 
To quote from the Consultation: 
Under the no look through principle, the ultimate investor may only bring an action against its 
immediate intermediary. The ultimate investor does not have the right to enforce the terms of the 
securities, or bring an action for breach of trust, against any higher-tier intermediary in the chain, 
including the company. For example, if a company defaults on its obligations to its shareholders, the 
ultimate investor will not be able to sue the company directly. Nor will the ultimate investor’s 
immediate intermediary be liable to the ultimate investor for the company’s default. (my emphasis 
added) 
Some inaccuracies in this statement are at apt to mislead and obscure reality. The “no look through” 
principle is cited by Richards LJ.38 A principle is a generalisation about how something works with 
few exceptions.39 However, while it is trite law that a person to a contract cannot sue or be sued 
upon it, it is not the case that the ultimate investor may only bring an action against an immediate 
intermediary. Nor is it true that the intermediary will not be liable to the ultimate investor for the 
company’s default. It depends on the circumstances. Take four short examples to demonstrate this.  
First is a statutory example. The quote above obscures the fact that an issuer of securities, i.e. the 
company, can have direct liability to the beneficial interest holder under existing specific statutory 
provisions.40 Next, the relationship between investor-fund manager-Custodian can be an express 
trust properly constituted.41 Some terms and conditions of fund providers expressly acknowledge 
this.42 But a trust may also exist ad hoc, if the circumstances do disclose that one exists. Clearly the 
Custodian holds the pooled interest for the ultimate investors’ benefit. If it is a trust then the 
                                                             
36 Second Consolidated Trust v Ceylon Amalgamated Estates [1943] 2 All E.R. 567 
37 Companies Act 2006, s 322 
38 Secure Capital v Credit Suisse [2017] EWCA Civ 1486; [2017] 2 CLC 428 at [10] – “the system operates on the 
basis of a “no look through” principle, whereby each party has rights only against their own counterparty.”; 
see also, Secure Capital v Credit Suisse [2015] EWHC 388 (Comm) at [58] 
39 P Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract, (OUP, 1979) 346 
40 See, for example, Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, s 90A and Schedule 10A, Parts 2 and 3, Paras 3, 8; 
discussed in more detail below 
41 Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (in administration) [2010] EWHC 2914 (Ch) at [226] 
42 The Share Centre Terms of Business, Clause 5.10 available at 
<https://www.share.com/globalassets/assets/downloads/tsc_tob.pdf> last accessed 04/11/2019; Freetrade’s 
Ltd claim in their terms and conditions, that their agreement does not create a “trust between us”, would not 
preclude a trust existing between the Custodian and investor 
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investor does have recourse against the Custodian where there is a breach of trust i.e. a higher-tier 
intermediary. Another example is it is well established in the Companies Act 2006, s 170 and 
common law43 that directors owe their duties to the company but that does not preclude owing 
duties to others. Finally, take negligence and Chandler v Cape Industries Plc.44 While the doctrine of 
corporate personality precluded a subsidiary’s employees suing the parent company in contract, it 
did not preclude them suing, successfully so, in the tort of negligence. The parent company assumed 
a duty of care to the employees on the basis of the test in Caparo Industries v Dickman.45 Indeed, 
Richards LJ acknowledges that while the “no look through” “principle” barred a claim in contract he 
was not suggesting it would bar a claim in tort.46 The claim that there is a “no look through” principle 
that amounts to an “ultimate investor…only” being able to bring an action against an “immediate 
intermediary” is akin to saying an end consumer could not sue a manufacturer for a snail in one’s 
drink. That is clearly not the law.  
The intermediated relationships frequently involve commitments that may fail to satisfy the formal 
requirements for contractual enforceability, whether it is privity or otherwise. For example, 
statements in prospectus, disclosures required by Transparency rules, or estimated or predicted 
returns on investments are not enforceable through contract by an ultimate investor. However, in 
the law of obligations, sensu lato, outside of contract law,47 formal requirements such as privity do 
not preclude actions against third parties in relation to those commitments. Tort, trusts, property, 
bailments, unjust enrichment, fiduciary duties, for example, are guided by their own norms and 
imperatives. They are all theoretically available to the ultimate investor to sue someone further up 
the intermediary chain, including the company as issuer and its directors. Existing authorities seem 
to focus on the issuer’s liability under the terms of the securities issue, which appears to be the 
source of some of this obscurity.48 
To avoid doubt, we should call the “no look through” principle privity of contract. As a species of that 
doctrine, only a member has enforceable rights qua member. Privity of contract is certainly not a 
principle of the law of obligations generally. Thus the short answer to question 8 is no. Privity of 
contract is not a problem. Problems have arisen because the law developed and was largely 
designed for certificated securities between two parties, which is no longer the case. The practical 
realities of the intermediated securities chain49 means third parties are the reality and the restriction 
of any rights of ultimate investors stems from having to rely on disparate and uncertain areas of law 
without unifying principles that make it difficult for even a lawyer to know what rights an investor 
has against third parties and vice versa. These rights will only provide intermittent protection, 
particularly as protection will depend on a case to case basis determined by the circumstances and 
what was agreed. For example, a reasonable investor will not doubt find it strange that a fund 
provider regulated by, and advertises itself as covered by, the FCA and covered by the FSCS only 
                                                             
43 Peskin v Anderson [2001] 1 BCLC 372 
44 [2012] EWCA Civ 525 
45 [1990] 2 AC 605; For discussion see, D Gibbs, ‘Chandler v Cape – Company Law: Corporate Groups’ (2013) 
24(1) International Company and Commercial Law Review N5-7 
46 Secure Capital v Credit Suisse [2017] EWCA Civ 1486; [2017] 2 CLC 428 at [56] and at [57] emphasising ‘in 
contract’; see also R Elias, ‘Legal Aspects of Collateral Swaps’ (2001) Journal of International Financial Markets 
232, 243 
47 Cf. Contracts (Rights Third Parties) Act 1999 
48 See, for example, Secure Capital v Credit Suisse [2015] EWHC 388 (Comm) at [58] and the articles cited 
therein; Law Commission, Intermediated Securities: Call for Evidence, para 2.36; Law Commission, Fiduciary 
Duties of Investment Intermediaries, (Law Com No 350, 2014) para 11.115 
49 See, for example, Secure Capital v Credit Suisse [2015] EWHC 388 (Comm) at [59]; Law Commission, 
Fiduciary Duties of Investment Intermediaries, (Law Com No 350, 2014) paras 11.120-32 
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covers some investments offered by that fund provider and not others. But this is also a problem for 
intermediaries who may not know the scope of their obligations to investors to properly assess their 
potential liability. Without a full empirical study, intuition and anecdotal observations suggest that 
litigation on fairly similar points is fairly frequent in this area.50 This cannot be conducive of an 
efficient market. 
These problems for investors and intermediaries alike in enforcing non-contractual rights in the 
intermediated chain can be demonstrated through two examples: negligence and third party 
reliance on contractual terms. The solution to this problem is a statutory remedy. 
Negligence 
For the example of negligence, establishing negligence to the relevant legal standard where there is 
loss in the intermediated securities may be difficult. For example, establishing the intermediaries in 
Eckerle had been negligent may prove impossible since there is no standard to judge the 
intermediary against to say they fell below what was reasonably expected of them and the burden is 
on the investor to establish the relevant causal requirement between act and loss.51 Further, it is 
unlikely the courts would seek to establish any such standard short of clear incompetence,52 
particularly as a multitude of factors can affect corporate value, which a judge is unlikely to assess.53 
A meritorious action may be stymied by procedural demands that place an unrealistic demand on 
ultimate investors because of either information asymmetry or financial naïveté. For example, 
corporate documentation is not generally provided to the ultimate investor, or they may only have a 
right to request it. Discovery of negligent conduct may be practically difficult. 
Third party reliance on contractual terms 
Now take third party reliance on contractual terms. The investment chain is established by an initial 
contract between the ultimate investor and the first intermediary.54 That contract may well 
empower, as the Freetrade example showed, a Custodian to act for the benefit of the investor. 
However, variants to this might involve the option for the investors to exercise the rights in the 
company or be exercised by the custodian as the default, as per the example in Wealthify, or 
contractually enfranchise the investors expressly. But to what extent are those terms in the initial 
investment contract relevant to the scope of the obligations owed between the removed 
intermediary, such as the custodian, and the investor? There is limited authority on this point in an 
intermediated securities context. Existing private law obligations such as bailments, tort, and 
fiduciary duties yield different results.55 This means the rights of the parties in this intermediated 
chain may well hinge on the nature of the complaint and the particular circumstances of the 
relationship relevant to what was initially agreed that leads to uncertain and intermittent protection 
for the investor.  
                                                             
50 For example, in preparing this response jurisdiction, issuer liability under the FSMA 2000, and contractual 
liability issues have appeared frequently enough since CREST went live and more so in recent years 
51 D Nolan and J Davies, Torts and Equitable Wrongs, in A Burrows (ed), English Private Law (OUP 3rd ed, 2013) 
17.61-65 
52 As relevant cases on the Companies Act 2006, s 174 demonstrate. See, for example, Dovey v Cory [1901] AC 
477 
53 See, for example, Bridge v Daley [2015] EWHC 2121 at [40]-[45] 
54 Law Commission, Fiduciary Duties of Investment Intermediaries, (Law Com No 350, 2014) para 11.113 also 
describes the chain as a series of trusts 
55 Another area that could have been considered below is agency law. However, such a matter vis-à-vis third 
party liability has been highlighted previously elsewhere and is not repeated here: See, The White Paper 
(Financial Services in the United Kingdom: A new framework for investor protection, 1985, Cmnd 9432) para 
10.6; and the Gower Report (Review of Investor Protection, 1984, Cmnd 9125) para 8.50 
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Bailment on terms 
Consider first bailment on terms. The relationship in the intermediated chain is similar to this type of 
legal relationship, which involves physical property bailed by one party to another who subsequently 
sub-bails to another down a chain. Bailment is unlikely to directly apply to dematerialised shares as 
there is nothing to physically possess.56 In dematerialised securities the interest not the note or 
certificate is traded.57 But the way in which sub-bailees and bailors may enforce the terms of the 
original bailment against one another is illustrative of how third parties can rely on contractual 
terms they are not party to.  
Bailment on terms is primarily illustrated in shipping cases, such as The Pioneer Container.58 This is 
where the owner has passed the goods to the carrier under a bailment who subsequently contracts 
under sub-bailment. Sub-bailment allows the sub-bailee to rely on terms of that sub-bailment 
against the owner. The owner and claimant had consented to a sub-bailment by the carrier ‘on any 
terms’. Here the claimants were bound by a jurisdiction clause to sub-bailees despite no contractual 
relationship existing between them. In Morris v CW Martin & Sons Ltd59 Lord Denning explained that 
a bailment on terms required the owner to have consented, either expressly or implicitly, “to the 
bailee making a sub-bailment containing those conditions”. Therefore if the owner does not consent, 
then a sub-bailee cannot rely on the terms in the contract.60 Whether an owner consents is a matter 
of construction of contract. The use of the phrase ‘on any terms’ evidenced that they had. 
The difficulty with reliance on third party terms by sub-bailees is it has never been normatively 
explained in modern terms why bailments are capable of being a functional equivalent to an 
exception to the doctrine of privity. Academic opinion offers little insight on the matter and judges 
seemingly accept Lord Denning’s obiter statement and Lord Goff’s non-binding decision as correct 
on the basis it has not been doubted by other authorities.61   
If one were to develop the law of third party rights in the intermediated chain by analogy to 
bailment on terms based on the similarities observed in each type of relationship, all they would 
need to demonstrate to incorporate the terms of the initial contract as binding between investor 
and third party is that the investor consented to the relevant terms the intermediary acted upon 
according to orthodox rules of contractual construction. They would, therefore, be bound to each 
other in regard to the respective obligations between investor and first intermediary. Whether the 
investor or third party can rely on the terms of the initial contract under a bailment claim, depends 
on the individual circumstances of the agreement. However, in the intermediated chain agreements 
appear to frequently exclude third party reliance on the contractual terms.62  
Tort 
Now consider how tort, particularly the duty of care, deals with third party reliance on terms. This 
can be sub-divided into two issues. The first is how the terms of the contract between an investor 
                                                             
56 See, Palmer, Palmer on Bailment, 3rd ed Ch 30; Where there are certificated shares there is authority for 
bailment to apply, MCC Proceeds Inc v Lehman Brothers International (Europe) [1998] 4 All ER 675; BBMB 
Finance Hong Kong Ltd v Eda Holdings Ltd [1990] WLR 409 
57 See, for example, Secure Capital v Credit Suisse [2017] EWCA Civ 1486; [2017] 2 CLC 428 at [9] 
58 [1994] 2 AC 324, PC 
59 [1966] 1 QB 716, 729 
60 The Pioneer Container [1994] 2 AC 324, 341, PC 
61 Singer Co (UK) Ltd v Tees and Hartlepool Port Authority [1988] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 164, 168 
62 See, for example, Secure Capital v Credit Suisse [2017] EWCA Civ 1486; [2017] 2 CLC 428 at [51]; Secure 
Capital v Credit Suisse [2015] EWHC 388 (Comm) at [58]; Freetrade’s Terms and Conditions; and The Share 
Centre, Terms of Business, Clause 12.7 
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and intermediary may scope the duty of care owed by a third party intermediary to the investor. The 
second is how exclusion clauses in that contract may be relied upon by the third party. 
Scope of the duty 
Starting with the scope of the duty, if a duty is owed, it is uncertain how the terms of the initial 
contract may scope the duty. Carver, in the context of carriage contracts, argues that “the terms of 
the contract of carriage may then be relevant in determining the extent of the duty (if any) owed by 
the carrier to the cargo-owner: e.g. the carrier is unlikely to owe any duty to heat the cargo if the 
contract is one to carry the goods in a ship without heating facilities”. However, Carver cites 
authority concerned with implied contracts, not negligence.63 Furthermore, the defendant was not 
the third party but an original contractor who had agreed what they undertook responsibility for. 
Seemingly, the terms of the contract act in some nebulous way in determining what the third party 
has assumed responsibility for, which may or may not be conclusively set out in a contract. This may 
vary from case to case in intermediated relationships. For example, some intermediaries do look to 
enfranchise their investors with the respective voting rights, while examples such as Freetrade 
demonstrate that others do not. Therefore, in the Freetrade example the intermediary may have a 
wider duty of care to investors than those where the investors are enfranchised.  
Thus the way a duty of care is scoped may lead to different outcomes in similar cases. Investors may 
place money in a platform in the same sort of fund, yet one investor may be owed a wider scope of 
care than the other based on the technical language of the contract agreed. A recent development in 
tort regarding vicarious liability may add to this uncertainty regarding tort liability. Here the 
Supreme Court held that if the facts disclose that an individual takes on activities that are integral to 
a business whereby the “commission of the wrongful act is a risk created by the defendant by 
assigning those activities to the individual in question”,64 the business may be vicariously liable for 
the torts committed by the individual. Thus, an investor may be able to look to the first intermediary 
for the torts of a higher-tiered intermediary only if the circumstances permit it. That, as mentioned, 
may vary from case to case. 
Exclusions Clauses 
Now consider exclusion clauses. Unlike bailments, a third party is not contractual bound in the initial 
contract on terms that exclude or limit liability for negligence due to absence of privity. Instead to 
rely on exclusions or limitations to the duty of care, the doctrine of notice or any relevant statutory 
provisions must be utilised. Smith v Bush held that a contract between a purchaser and mortgagee 
that excluded the mortgagee and valuer’s liability for negligence, could be relied upon by the valuer 
by virtue of notice and the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, ss 1(1)(b), 2(1) but was still liable on the 
specific facts of the case.65 That is to say that a party may rely on an exclusion of liability for 
negligence under their duty of care provided any complainant had notice of such an exclusion. The 
ability of a third party to rely on or be subject to a notice of exclusion in a contract is also part of 
common law.66 
Effective notice is not just contractual construction. Notice includes constructive notice.67 
Construction of terms as notices excluding liability also depends on the nature of the relationship i.e. 
                                                             
63 G Treitel and F Reynolds, Carver on Bills of Lading (Sweet and Maxwell 4td ed, 2017) 5.133; Citing Mitsui & 
Co Ltd v Novorossiysk Shipping Co (The Gudermes) [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 311 at 326 
64 Cox v Ministry of Justice [2016] UKSC 10, [2016] AC 660 at [24], [30] 
65 [1990] 1 AC 831, HL 
66 Davies v Parry (1988) 20 HLR 452, 466; Hedley Bryne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465  
67 For some recent discussion in case law on the doctrine of notice see, for example, Barclays Bank Plc v 
O’Brien [1994] 1 AC 180 (HL); and Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v Etridge (No 2) [2001] UKHL 44, [2002] 2 AC 773 
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commercial or consumer. In this context, the law may differentiate between retail and institutional 
investors for the purposes of interpreting exclusion clauses. Taberna Europe CDO II Plc v Selskabet af 
1 September 2008 A/S (formerly Roskilde Bank A/S) (In Bankruptcy)68 confirms that while the contra 
proferentem rule is unlikely to apply between commercial parties i.e. institutional investors, thus 
orthodox construction to its interpretation does, but it may well do so for consumer, i.e. retail 
investors. In effect, the potential liability in negligence of an intermediary in the chain may well 
depend on who the complainant is. Therefore, exclusion of liability for negligence is possible if such 
an effective notice is construed according to the rules of construction to have done so.  
There is also the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999. If the initial contract excludes liability 
for the benefit of an intermediary, satisfying the requirements of the Act, the third party may rely on 
that term. This creates an additional layer of protection for the third party intermediary, who 
seemingly may be able to rely on a term under this Act, or a notice under the UCTA 1977. Subject to 
any differences between terms and notices, they appear to be functional equivalents in terms of 
outcome subject to CRTPA 1999, s 7(2) and the UCTA 1977, s 2(2). The former provides that a third 
party cannot invoke the latter to contest the validity of the term on grounds of reasonableness. Thus 
should an intermediary seek to claim the benefit of an exclusion clause as third party, they could 
avoid it being scrutinised on grounds of reasonableness. However, if the third party relies on the 
term as a notice in respect to their own duty of care, the UCTA 1977 remains operational and is 
subject to a test of reasonableness.  
As such, liability in tort of a third party may rest on the specific terms of the contract that determine 
its scope, whether there was sufficient notice regarding exclusions, the status of the relevant 
contracting parties, and which legislation is being applied. Looking at some fund’s terms and 
conditions, it would seem that since they expressly excluded third party reliance on the terms, an 
intermediary removed up the chain would be unable to rely on any exclusions to liability. While the 
agreements of Freetrade and The Share Centre do not exclude liability for negligence, they do 
exclude other types of liability. While that would preclude the immediate intermediary being liable, 
it does not mean that the investor could not look to the higher tiered intermediary for any potential 
liability arising from tort. 
Fiduciary Duties 
Finally, consider how a complaint based on fiduciary duties applies different principles in regards to 
third party reliance on terms than bailments and torts and how individual claims of fiduciary duty 
breach may yield different results. 
Previously, it has not been clearly explained how a contract determines fiduciary duties. A recent 
paper explains this interaction is a two-stage process.69 While the role of contract demonstrates that 
protection for ultimate investors will be intermittent, one key benefit of recognising this two-stage 
process is that if the third party can rely on the terms, it will make it easier to know when one is in a 
fiduciary relationship in the investment chain and the scope of those duties. Failure to recognise this 
process so far has led to some errors in the law, both in reasoning and in outcomes. 
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To summarise this two-stage process: The conventional wisdom, that the 2014 Consultation appears 
to proceed upon, is that the duty of loyalty is determined in a single-stage process. One starts with a 
blank slate, and then positively implies the duty of loyalty if the nature of the engagement – defined 
by the terms of the contract – demands it. 
Most judgments proceed on the basis that, in ad hoc cases, the terms of the contract are important 
in some rather nebulous way. The classic exposition is in Hospital Products Ltd v United States 
Surgical Corporation, which illustrates this: 
[I]t is the contractual foundation which is all important because it is the contract that regulates the 
basic rights and liabilities of the parties. The fiduciary relationship, if it is to exist at all, must 
accommodate itself to the terms of the contract so that it is consistent with, and conforms to, them. 
The fiduciary relationship cannot be superimposed upon the contract in such a way as to alter the 
operation which the contract was intended to have according to its true construction.70 
This passage has been quoted in the stage two cases of Northampton Regional Livestock Centre 
Company Ltd v Cowling,71 Hilton v Barker Booth & Eastwood72 and Global Container Lines Ltd v 
Bonyad Shipping Co (No 1)73 and the stage one cases of Ranson v Customer Systems plc74 and Fujitsu 
Services Ltd v IBM United Kingdom Ltd.75 Ranson was cited with approval by Lord Neuberger MR in 
the stage two case of Rossetti Marketing Ltd v Diamond Sofa Co Ltd.76 Further vague statements can 
be seen, such as ‘[t]he precise scope of [the duty of loyalty] must be moulded according to the 
nature of the relationship’77 and the defendant’s ‘capacity to make decisions . . . is inconsistent [with 
the existence of a general fiduciary relationship]’.78 
However, the correct analysis, it is argued, is a two-stage process. In a first stage, the duty of loyalty 
is raised in a multi-factorial enquiry that considers the nature of the engagement, just as the 
conventional wisdom dictates. In this stage, it is a balancing exercise and no single factor is 
conclusive. However, there is then a second stage, which uses the contractual doctrines of 
interpretation and implication. This stage is akin to the non-contractual process of authorisation of 
what would otherwise be a breach of fiduciary duty. This second stage can only reduce, not enlarge, 
the scope of the duty of loyalty. It is sharply logical and ordered. If the conditions in the authorising 
terms are met, the duty of loyalty is reduced accordingly. There is no balancing and weighing in the 
second stage. 
The central normative argument to support the case for a two-stage process, in brief, is as follows. 
We consider, from first principles, how the underlying nature of the duty of loyalty drives the law 
into a particular structure. It is the only way to resolve the fiduciary duty’s internal tension between  
controlling the fiduciary’s self-interest and the principal’s autonomy to authorise, when fully 
informed, what would otherwise be a self-interested act. At the first-stage, the protective nature of 
the duty of loyalty positively demands a multifactorial approach because a sharply logical approach 
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is too susceptible to evasion. The trade-off is that this stage must be relatively uncertain. Conversely, 
once the duty of loyalty has been raised, there must be a relatively certain, sharply logical second 
phase to authorise what would otherwise be a breach of fiduciary duty. This is so that a fiduciary is 
not caught out and subject to swingeing liability where fully-informed authorisation has been 
obtained. This is the quid pro quo for the relatively uncertain first stage. It also means that the 
contractual doctrines are appropriate in the second stage, although they are still subject to 
overriding fiduciary principles. Exactly how is explored in the article and discussed below. 
What this two-stage process means for investment intermediaries and even the company and its 
directors is that first, even if they are not in an immediate relationship with the end investor this 
should not preclude a fiduciary relationship being established. Quite rightly, the more remote the 
relationship the harder it will be to establishing fiduciary duties are owed to the ultimate investor. 
However, the relationship, as defined by the terms of the contract, might reveal an express trust or 
an assumption of responsibility undertaken by an intermediary or the company to the ultimate 
investor. As Lord Templeman explained in the context of house valuations, that while a mortgagee 
does not assume responsibility to the purchaser for the valuation, the valuer does assume 
responsibility to both mortgagee and purchaser by agreeing to carry out a valuation for mortgage 
purposes knowing that the valuation fee has been paid by the purchaser in order to decide whether 
or not to enter into a contract to purchase the house.79 Thus, the same principle applies here. As the 
Freetrade example above shows, the Custodian entitled to vote does so on behalf of the ultimate 
investor. It is an express trust properly constituted. Regardless there is an assumption of 
responsibility. Therefore, if the intermediary assumes responsibility to a point where fiduciary duties 
arise, the intermediary is potentially liable to the investor despite the “no look through” principle. 
However, given the fact specific nature of this potential liability as a stage-one issue, the ultimate 
investor may not be consistently able to establish there is a fiduciary relationship, either against 
different intermediaries or the same ones in different contracts, if the terms of the individual 
contracts indicate that it should not.  
Next is to consider how those terms might scope the duty owed at stage-two. The difficulty here is 
that which has already been established. The fiduciary intermediary is not privy to the contract. 
There is no authority on whether terms of that contract that scope that fiduciary duty would have to 
be repeated in the trust deed with the intermediary or whether consent in the initial contract is 
enough. For example, suppose the initial contract between investor and fund manager permits the 
custodian to take a 1% commission. Therefore, that would not be a breach of fiduciary duty to take 
that commission. However, if that term is not repeated in the trust deed would the intermediary be 
able to scope their fiduciary duty with reference to that term?80 Based on the “no look through” 
principle and case law applying it, the answer would seem to be no. But the authorities do not really 
engage with this point regarding any fiduciary relationship between ultimate investor and removed 
intermediary. Their focus is on privity in regards to direct actions by an ultimate investor against 
issuer.81 If one does exist between investor and removed intermediary, the courts will be placed on 
the horns of a dilemma between the autonomy of the investor who authorised the commission and 
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the strict rules of privity. This is where analogy with bailment on terms could be utilised and 
autonomy could and perhaps should prevail as a matter of practicality and reducing transaction 
costs. 
Assuming that the terms of the contract do scope any fiduciary duty of an investment intermediary 
removed up the chain, those terms need to be consistent with fiduciary principles, as opposed to 
orthodox interpretation of contractual terms. Thus, unlike in bailments or tort, third party reliance 
on terms would be subject to overriding fiduciary principles specific to the nature of the fiduciary 
relationship. 
This second stage and the application of fiduciary principles helps resolves the internal tension 
between the autonomy of the beneficiary and their vulnerable position to opportunism from the 
fiduciary. The fiduciary’s ability to act is circumscribed by what the ultimate investor permitted. 
Autonomy negates the protective function of the fiduciary duty but only where the autonomy is 
exercised on a fully disclosed basis.82 Otherwise the vulnerable position of the ultimate investor is 
exposed to opportunism from the intermediary. The same principle applies where there is ambiguity 
in the interpretation of what was permitted. Such terms will be interpreted contra proferentem. This 
respects the ultimate investor’s autonomy and protects them from opportunism when new or 
unforeseen situations arise. It would be impossible to start with a finely tuned duty that covers 
future events.  
Therefore, if one were to take an example of a contractual term that permits a 1% commission, this 
would not be a breach of fiduciary duty for taking that commission. The autonomy principle negates 
the protective function of the fiduciary duty. Now suppose the intermediary-Custodian is entitled to 
vote for the benefit of an ultimate investor, such a term permits just that and no more. Unless it can 
be implied,83 the term does not expressly authorise the intermediary to vote with a conflict of 
interest. The risk of opportunism in permitting them to do so is too great. Such a term is then 
interpreted contra proferentem to protect the beneficiary from opportunism inherent in such 
ambiguity. 
But yet again, the problem for ultimate investors is what the contractual terms permit vary from 
case to case. Therefore, some investors may be protected while others are not. Uncertainty in 
contractual terms may also be difficult to reconcile. The fact this two-stage process is yet to be 
formally recognised by the courts adds another layer of difficulty.  
As such individual cases on each of these private law obligations may yield different results from 
case to case, but also different results may be reached depending on the nature of the complaint 
when third parties seek to rely on those terms. If it is one of bailment, all that needs to be 
established is consent to the terms and a third party can rely on them. If the complaint is in tort, the 
doctrine of notice and contra proferentem may determine the extent of third party reliance on 
terms but privity will exclude third party reliance on other exclusions in the contract. But if it is a 
complaint about a fiduciary duty, it is uncertain if the third party can even rely on the initial contract 
and if they can, unlike bailments and tort, the interpretation of those terms is subject to overriding 
principles to reflect the normative function of fiduciary law.   
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The above has been a discussion in abstract and largely hypothesising about how a court may treat 
third party non-contractual claims in the intermediated securities chain, particularly in relation to 
tort claims and third party reliance on terms. It shows that attempts to do so may yield different 
results. There is limited case law on third party reliance on terms in cases specifically related to the 
intermediated chain. This is likely due to it being a relatively recent phenomenon. However, some 
authorities give some limited insight into how they may be approached. They largely reinforce the 
point already made: investors are intermittently protected based on the nature of the complaint, 
circumstance and what was agreed. 
With exclusion clauses, intermediaries should be able to rely on them against the initial investor on 
the basis of UCTA 1977 notice requirements.84 Beyond exclusion clauses, the CRTPA 1999 may also 
determine the obligations of the intermediary if they satisfy the requirements of the Act. However, 
as mentioned, most contracts explicitly exclude third party reliance on such terms and would, 
therefore, be inapplicable.  
Jurisdiction clauses can also be problematic, as Profit Investment Sim SpA v Ossi85 shows. Formal 
requirements of consent in writing for jurisdiction clauses may preclude an intermediary relying on 
such clauses. The case confirms that for a third party to succeed to the rights of a jurisdiction clause, 
it would have to be done in accordance with national law. Since there is no privity between the 
parties, there can be no succession. Therefore, an intermediary could not rely on a jurisdiction 
clause in the initial contract as much as an investor could not rely on a jurisdiction clause in the 
securities issue. 
Anderson v Sense Network Ltd86 highlights how contractual terms in one contract in the intermediary 
chain may restrict protection offered by regulatory measures. Therefore demonstrating how 
investors are subject to intermittent protection. In this case, Midas, which became the respondent’s, 
Sense Network Ltd (SN), Appointed Representative (AR) under an agreement in 200787 to advise 
clients on investments and arrange deals. As AR, SN was principal to Midas for the purposes of 
responsibility for regulatory compliance.88 Put another way, SN was an authorised person accepting 
responsibility for the AR’s regulatory compliance for which they would be exempt. Midas had hid a 
fraudulent Ponzi scheme from its principal, which investors also invested in. The investors argued 
that the scheme operated by Midas was business for which the principal had responsibility under 
the FSMA 2000, s 39(3)89 and a collective investment scheme for the purposes of FSMA 2000, s 235 
for which the principal is vicariously liable.  
However, the Court of Appeal held that a principal’s responsibility under the FCA Handbook and 
section 39 dependent not only on a generic list of categories of business for which they were 
authorised. The liability SN took responsibility for was only in relation to “acts or omissions of the AR 
                                                             
84 Taberna Europe CDO II Plc v Selskabet af 1 September 2008 A/S (formerly Roskilde Bank A/S) (In Bankruptcy) 
[2016] EWCA Civ 1262; [2017] Q.B. 633; IFE Fund S.A. v Goldman Sachs International [2007] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 264 
85 Case C-366/13 [2016] 1 WLR 3832; see also Secure Capital v Credit Suisse [2017] EWCA Civ 1486; [2017] 2 
CLC 428 
86 [2019] EWCA Civ 1395 
87 Replaced in 2013 
88 e.g. FCA Handbook Supervision Manual Ch.12 (SUP 12); FSMA 2000; FMSA 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 
2001 (SI 2001/544) 
89 FSMA 2000, s 39(3) – The principal of an appointed representative is responsible, to the same extent as if he 
had expressly permitted it, for anything done or omitted by the representative in carrying on the business for 
which he has accepted responsibility. 
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“in carrying on the business for which [the authorised person] has accepted responsibility for””.90 
Section 39 acted in conjunction with the AR agreement, which enabled principals to limit the scope 
of the type of business they accepted responsibility for. Since the express clause limited the 
principal’s responsibility to that outlined in cl 3.1 of the AR agreement, Midas’ advice to the 
appellant investors to invest in a fraudulent scheme fell outside the business for which the principal 
had accepted responsibility for.91 The court continued that the principal was not vicariously liable. 
They were not carrying out activities assigned to them by the principal as part of its business and for 
its benefit.92 
The court held “an authorised person cannot accept responsibility for a business which it does not 
have authorisation from the FCA”.93 A sensible conclusion as a matter of law. In doing so it highlights 
the problem of third parties in the intermediated chain. The investor, as third party, is engaging with 
Midas through SN. Yet SN’s responsibility to the investors for the conduct of Midas is circumscribed 
through a private agreement between SN and Midas. While the authorised person, SN, is required to 
disclose “information as to the services which he holds himself out as able to provide”, there is no 
applicable provision for appointed representatives to enable the investor to identify the activities 
that the AR is permitted to carry on.94 Placing the burden on the investor to discover this is 
cumbersome. Even if the AR did have to disclose those activities, it is unlikely a retail investor would 
actually look before investing, particularly as some providers can be regulated and covered by the 
FCA and FSCS, even if particular investments are not, such as “execution-only” transactions,95 making 
it incredibly confusing for investors.  
What these examples appear to disclose is that the investor is at the mercy of circumstance as to 
whether their losses will be legally protected. There appears to be a lack of coherent principles in 
the regulation and private law obligations and it is both parties suffering from the uncertainty: The 
investor, who is shouldering the risk of loss; and the issuer and intermediary who are unsure of their 
liability. 
Summary and Statutory Exception 
To summarise, the “no look through” principle is not a principle at all. The “no look through” 
principle is actually privity of contract (only parties to the contract can sue) and statutory 
interpretation (a member is the one on the register). Focus on this façade ignores a deeper level 
issue. That is, as the market has developed, the ultimate investor is forced to rely on disparate areas 
of law that are dependent on circumstances in the absence of specific legal provisions. Even when 
there is regulation some of the protection is still heavily dictated to by contract. This may well lead, 
or has lead, to a haphazard development of the law, encourage litigation to exploit uncertainties, 
increase transaction costs, and result in unjust lacuna in law whereby some investors are protected 
but others are not. Indeed there have been 4 cases in 4 years regarding the liability of an authorised 
person under FSMA 2000, s 39 yielding different outcomes for the investors.96 Also the ultimate 
investors in Public Joint-Stock Company Commercial Bank “Privatbank” were “enfranchised” but the 
                                                             
90 [2019] EWCA Civ 1395 at [35] 
91 [2019] EWCA Civ 1395 at [29]-[35] and [55]-[57] 
92 [2019] EWCA Civ 1395 at [64]-[65] 
93 [2019] EWCA Civ 1395 at [37] 
94 See FSMA 2000, s 347(1), (2)(a), (j); and [44]-[45] 
95 FCA Handbook, Advising on Investments, Art 53; See also, FCA Conduct of Business Sourcebook Arts 9-10 
96 [2019] EWCA Civ 1395; R v Financial Ombudsman (on the application of Tenetconnect Services Ltd [2018] 
EWHC 459 (Admin); Ovcharenko v InvestUK Ltd [2017] EWHC 2114 (QB); Personal Touch Financial Services Ltd 
v SimplySure Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 461 
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ultimate investors in Eckerle v Wickeder Westfalenstahl GmbH and Secure Capital SA v Credit Suisse 
AG were not.97 
Since the difficulty or problem lies not in the “no look through principle” but potential solutions 
being potential varied and unpredictable, a solution may well be to develop a specific statutory 
remedy for ultimate investors to pursue loss or wrongdoing by intermediaries and/or the company 
and its directors. This may well be specific to retail investors who are in a more vulnerable position. 
Some ideas on what that remedy may look like can be drawn from existing legislation that cuts 
through intermediated relationships. 
One example is the Consumer Protection Act 1987. It solved the problem of end-consumers having 
to sue manufacturers in the tort of negligence for harm caused by defective goods by cutting out the 
requirement of tort causation and preventing exclusions by creating specific statutory liability. The 
statute provides that manufacturers are strictly liable for harm caused by defective goods.98  
Another example can be drawn from existing statutory provisions on securities. This is FSMA 2000, 
particularly ss 39, 90, and 90A. For section 90, liability for deceit or misrepresentation or negligence 
could not normally extend to the secondary market for the purchase of shares because of the 
requirement that “the maker of the statement be aware of the transaction to which it relates”.99 The 
problems are cut through by that legislation by requiring compensation to be paid to anyone 
acquiring securities to which the particulars apply where the loss is a result of an untrue or 
misleading statement relating to those particulars or an omission of information required in the 
particulars by that legislation.  
With section 39, this overcomes the problems inherent in agency law, since the authorised person is 
liable for the acts of the Appointed Representative “to the same extent as if he had expressly 
permitted it”. Thus, it overcomes issues regarding express, implied, and apparent authority for 
determining the principal’s liability for acts of the agent at common law.  
Section 90A is a particularly important example for ultimate investors. It establishes that, in 
accordance with Schedule 10A, an issuer will be liable to pay compensation to persons who have 
suffered loss as a result of misleading statements or dishonest omissions in certain published 
information relating to securities or a dishonest delay in publishing information. Schedule 10A, Part 
2, para 3(1) provides: 
An issuer of securities to which this Schedule applies is liable to pay compensation to a 
person who—  
(a) acquires, continues to hold or disposes of the securities in reliance on published 
information to which this Schedule applies, and  
(b) suffers loss in respect of the securities as a result of—  
(i) any untrue or misleading statement in that published information, or  
(ii) the omission from that published information of any matter required to be included in 
it. 
                                                             
97 [2017] EWCA Civ 1486, [2017] 10 WLUK 154 
98 Consumer Protection Act 1987, s 2 
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The interpretation of someone who is consider to be “a person who acquires, continues to hold or 
disposes of securities” is set out in Schedule 10A, Part 3, para 8(3), (4) as: 
References in this Schedule to the acquisition or disposal of securities include— 
(a) acquisition or disposal of any interest in securities, or 
(b) contracting to acquire or dispose of securities or of any interest in securities, except 
where what is acquired or disposed of (or contracted to be acquired or disposed of) is a 
depositary receipt, derivative instrument or other financial instrument representing 
securities.  
(4) References to continuing to hold securities have a corresponding meaning. 
In a recent case the court held that the issuer of securities, held through an intermediated chain in 
dematerialised form through a CREST account, was liable to those who had never acquired the legal 
interest in the shares.100 The critical word is contained in the Act is in Schedule 10A, Part 3, s 8(3) 
which extends the meaning of acquisition, disposal, or holding to any interest, not just legal interest. 
Tesco’s claims that the claimants had no “interest” in securities nor had the “acquired”, “disposed”, 
or “held” securities failed for that reason.101 
It is possible that this last example offers some degree of protection for retail investors already, on 
top of what FCA and FSCS already provides. It might be that it could extend further for retail 
investors. Given the nature of intermediation and the lack of transparency in the market,102 it may 
be difficult for an investor to know if they have actually acquired, disposed of, or held securities as a 
result misleading statements or dishonest omissions. Even if they are aware of the securities they 
hold, demonstrating a causal link between loss and act may be difficult. A modest amendment for 
retail investors to reduce their risk may be to impose strict liability for misleading statements and 
dishonest omissions.  
What exactly that statutory provision should be is beyond the scope of this response but above has 
highlighted potential problems regarding Appointed Representatives and the lack of regulation 
regarding authorised persons offering unregulated activities. However, it should look to provide a 
simple legislative response to wrongdoing in the investment chain, particularly to fill the gaps in 
protection and cut through problems left by private common law solutions and existing legislative 
and regulatory provisions. For example, where a company has not gone insolvent but loss has been 
suffered, where the risk profile of a fund changes, instances of fraud or negligence as the Anderson 
litigation demonstrated, or instances of misleading or dishonest activity, as in SL Claimants.  
Such a proposal should benefit investors by protecting them from loss and reduce the unfair risk 
placed on them.103 They currently invest their money but have no rights qua “member” in the 
companies invested in and, as set out above, establishing liability on private law or regulatory 
grounds can be uncertain and intermittent. However, a statutory proposal can also benefit 
intermediaries and companies. The benefits should include, first the reduction in transaction costs. 
Having to ‘enfranchise’ ultimate investors, draft contracts that seek to protect intermediaries from 
liability in the law of obligations, or defend such cases based on uncertainties increases the cost of 
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transacting.104 A legislative rule can cut through that to simplify and/or clarify the matter for all 
concerned. For example, investors in Woodford Investment Management brought via the financial 
platform Hargreaves Lansdown, perhaps on the advice of a financial advisor. The complainant could 
go to the financial advisor and then the ombudsman if the complaint is not resolved. Any claim 
against Hargreaves Lansdown their liability depends on whether the investor relied upon them for 
advice. They would have notices saying this is not advice on things such as their top 10 buys. 
However, many people do take it as advice to make decisions. Ascertaining who did and did not rely 
on that information as advice will require detailed assessment of facts in individual cases leaving 
some investors protected and others not. Complaining against Woodford Investment Management 
would be difficult if it acted within the scope of the fund. For one there is no contract between 
Woodford Investment Management and the investor where they purchased via a financial platform. 
Also, even if the investor argued that what happened went beyond what they reasonably expected, 
that is not a ground for suit unless it falls outside what was legally permissible. Second, any fear that 
statutory liability will increase litigation faced by intermediaries or the company should be 
unfounded. The existence of other remedies, such as the FSCS, will limit intermediary exposure to 
any increase in litigation. It should only be those instances where those remedies do not apply 
should any legislation be utilised by ultimate investors.105 Thus, corporate law is unlikely to become 
“unworkable”. Finally, by reducing the risk to the ultimate investor it should increase trust and 
transparency in the system and encourage investment. Lack of transparency is one of the main 
reasons people choose not to invest. Improvements via statute to the intermediary chain should free 
up capital in the system.   
The final point to make is that a statutory solution may be limited to retail investors. Experienced 
institutional investors may well be able to internalise such costs and take the appropriate risks with 
insurance. A retail investor is rarely able to do so or think to do so. The law is complex and does not 
appear to be fit for purpose for retail investors. Wholesale revision on the law relating to retail 
investors might be necessary. That should at least focus on transparency of information with the 
emphasis placed on the intermediary to do so, the right to move investments from companies and 
funds, the right to buy legal title to shares, and direct remedial rights against intermediaries and the 
company and its directors. 
 
Question 9 
In practice, what, if any, are the benefits of the no look through principle? 
It seems unnecessary to reiterate in detail the benefits of privity of contract.  
 
Question 10 
Do you consider that the regulatory regime alone is sufficient to address the risks and 
consequences of an insolvency in a chain of investment intermediaries?  
For answers to QQ10-14 see question 14 below. 
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Do you consider that there is merit in our reviewing the consequences of insolvency in an 
intermediated securities chain from a legal, as opposed to regulatory, perspective? 
 
Question 12 
Do you consider that the insolvency of an intermediary in an intermediated securities chain has 
the potential to cause problems? In what way? 
If so: 
(1) Do you have examples, or specific evidence, of problems arising out of the insolvency of an 
intermediary in an intermediated securities chain? 
(2) What could be done to solve these problems? 
 
Question 13 
Do you consider that there is uncertainty about how assets would be distributed in the event of an 
intermediary’s insolvency? If so, how could this uncertainty be resolved? 
 
Question 14 
Do you consider that there is a need for better education of ultimate investors about the risks of 
an intermediary’s insolvency, and a better awareness about the application of the Financial 
Services Compensation Scheme? 
What could be done to reduce the exposure of ultimate investors in the event of an intermediary’s 
insolvency? 
Notably the FSCS covers most loss in the event of insolvency. The proposal above for a statutory 
remedy may include situations where an intermediary or a company has gone insolvent, if the 
circumstances that brought about insolvency resulted in loss or wrongdoing covered by any 
statutory regime. This should aim to protect those few investors who fall outside the FSCS limits 
whereby they can recover any additional loss subject to specific rules on distribution of assets in 
insolvency. Thus, it may be necessary for any statutory remedy to prescribe how it operates in the 
context of insolvency. 
I do not think better education is needed per se, but better transparency of the remedies currently 
available and also better regulation on when firms can advertise such protection offered by the 
FSCS. London Capital and Finance plc, for example, were authorised by the FCA and protected by the 
FSCS but not all the investments they provided were covered, leaving 11,605 investors £236m 
investment unprotected.  
Most intermediaries will only advertise that they are covered by the FSCS. Stating that it is capped at 
£85,000 should increase awareness of what is covered. Also, when investing, anyone providing a 
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product covered by the FCA and FSCS should receive information about the protection offered from 
the product provider, much like the requirement on banks to do so when opening a bank account. If 
this is already a requirement it is not universally being done, since personal experience from two 
funds I invest in have not provided any information of the sort.  
Also, in cases such as London Capital and Finance, they should be required to make it clear what 
they are authorised to do by the FCA and what is covered on each individual investment. 
Alternatively, the FSCS should provide compensation in the event of any intermediary’s insolvency 
where they are regulated by the FCA, regardless of whether the particular investment is covered i.e. 
execution-only services. The complex nature of the regulatory regime makes it unfair, at least for 
retail investors, to suffer the loss from an intermediary’s insolvency due to an oddity in the 
regulation that goes against the reasonable expectations of the investor.  
 
Question 15 
Do you consider that the application of a right to set off has the potential to cause problems in the 
context of an intermediated securities chain? 
If so: 
(1) Do you have examples, or specific evidence, of such problems? 




Do you consider that the disparity in the way that purchasers of directly held securities and 
intermediated securities are protected by law has the potential to cause problems? 
If so: 
(1) Do you have examples, or specific evidence, of such problems? 
(2) What could be done to solve these problems? 
Yes. The intermediary is best placed to assess the quality of that title and the end investor should 
have suitable recourse against the intermediary for that error. The Freetrade example mentioned 
above demonstrates that the intermediary may well be in breach of express terms if they fail to 
provide the relevant interest in the securities to the investor because they state the investor is the 
“ultimate owner”. Without such express terms in the agreement or lack of privity, investors should 
not have to rely on tort law to remedy any issue that should arise with defective title. I would 
initially support the idea of strict liability for an intermediary purchasing securities with defective 





Do you consider that the application of section 53(1)(c) of the Law of Property Act 1925 has the 
potential to cause problems in the context of an intermediated securities chain? 
If so: 
(1) Do you have examples, or specific evidence, of such problems? 
(2) What could be done to solve these problems? 
In the context of a person’s estate when they die intestate, securities held by that person can be 
given by the lawyer to a stock broker to sell, rather than the executor or trustee instructing the 
lawyer to do so.  
While the problems of the 1925 Act are highlighted, there is an absence of explanation in the Call for 
why there is, or perhaps was, a need for writing in the disposition of an equitable interest. The 2014 
Consultation refers to it as an “anachronism”.106 Therefore, just because the 1925 Act, s 53(1)(c) 
does not reflect modern practice of settling computerised securities and creates problems it does 
not mean the justification is redundant or there is new justification in the modern context i.e. 
investors knowing when funds are transferred, which may be relevant to them personally for 
reasons such as knowing where money is invested.  
Equally, one might say that the complaint that the law does not reflect the modern settlement 
practice is untrue. The electronic settlement process applies to the legal title, which the 1925 Act 
does not apply to.  
 
Question 18 
Do you consider that distributed ledger technology has the potential to facilitate the exercise of 
shareholders’ rights and, if so, in what way? What are the obstacles to adoption of this 
technology? 
Are there any other jurisdictions we should look to as examples? 
It has become too difficult to purchase legal title to securities. They are meant to be freely 
transferable but are effectively only freely transferable amongst selected institutions. As the 
consultations acknowledges, CREST membership amongst individuals is now below 10,000. 
Securities are a significant source of wealth, yet, if only 5,400 individuals have direct access to that 
wealth, the majority are cut off from potentially significant redistributive benefits from investing.107 
While the advantages of intermediation are made clear and drive this model of securities 
‘ownership’,108 it should not be at the expense of closing the market off to other forms for the 
investor to hold securities. If an individual is willing to take the risk of owning shares personally, they 
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should be enabled and not disabled from entering the market. The perception is that the law, by 
immobilising securities, has enabled intermediaries to corner a market and make entry for 
individuals very difficult.  
As such, I would support any technology that allows legal title to be held by the investor and not the 
intermediary for reasons stated above regarding transferable shares, property and wealth 
distribution. I do doubt whether it will result in intermediaries not being needed, as the Call 
considers,109 but more likely fewer being necessary. The efficiencies in intermediation should still 
drive that model of investing. Expertise on where to invest, how to vote and so on is still valuable 
and what drives the current shape of the market and is likely to persist even with DLT. 
It may also improve governance with regard to greater representation from those from different 
backgrounds, discussed in question 27. 
 
Question 19 
We welcome consultees’ views on, and any evidence of, ways in which technology in general 




Has the market started to prepare for the dematerialisation that would be required under CSDR? 




Are there approaches in relation to dematerialisation in the context of CSDR which could be 
applied to the ultimate investors in an intermediated chain to provide ultimate investors with the 




Are there concerns about imposing dematerialisation on long-time shareholders currently holding 
paper certificates, when they may not be confident users of technology? 
I think it is best to phase out paper-based certificates. As long term paper based shares pass through 
people’s estates, this may be the best time to move them across to electronic records. 
Perhaps a modest amendment to the Law of Property Act 1925 will facilitate this, whereby paper 
share certificates passed under an estate must be settled using the electronic register. 
                                                             





We welcome comments from consultees as to whether there are aspects of the law of the 









We welcome suggestions from consultees as to other issues which arise in practice which should 
be included in our scoping study. For each issue, we would be grateful for the following 
information: 
(1) A summary of the problem. 
(2) An explanation of and evidence of the effect of the problem in practice. 
(3) Suggestions as to what could be done to solve the problem, and any evidence of the costs and 
benefits of the solution. 
A recent podcast has highlighted the problems, particularly women, face in investing.110 One 
particular concern is the use of jargon. One issue I wish to raise in this context is how these products 
are being described by the fund provider when purchased by an investor. I shall use the examples of 
Freetrade and The Share Centre to demonstrate this. 
What is described or advertised by these providers is not what is being purchased by the investor. In 
the example of Freetrade if an investor looks at the Freetrade website or app the investor is invited 
to “purchase stock” in well-known companies. The Share Centre also recently sent around an e-mail 
communication. The e-mail uses phrases such as “owning shares…[is] about owning a part of the 
business” and “when you invest in a company, you become one of its owners and earn the right to 
have a say in how it runs its business”.  
Both examples demonstrate that the investor is being told what they are purchasing is a share of a 
business. A share in a business includes some form of participation rights and not just an “interest” 
measured by a “sum of money”.111 Shares are also described as personal property.112 These 
descriptions of a share do not correspond with what is actually being purchased in these examples. 
The terms of both Freetrade, described above in question 1, and The Share Centre113 make it clear 
                                                             
110 BBC Radio 4, Money Box: How do I start investing? Podcast. First aired 18th September 2019 
111 See, Borland’s Trustee v Steel Bros & Co Ltd [1901] 1 Ch 279, 288 
112 Companies Act 2006, s 541 
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that the investor is not purchasing the legal title. Indeed, The Share Centre’s terms of business 
identify that investments are pooled in a nominee account with no separate certification to evidence 
legal ownership and may not, therefore, be identifiable. Likewise, despite, Freetrade claiming the 
investor will be purchasing stock, the terms provide that the Custodian may use a single account 
with all the customers’ funds deposited into it.  
It is trite law that personal property be identifiable. Therefore, the purchase is not a share purchase. 
Likewise, the absence of legal ownership, means the investors have no respective rights as members 
against the company. The Freetrade example makes that clear, and while The Share Centre does 
enfranchise its investors, that investor still has no respective enforcement rights against the 
company, meaning they are not considered the member in legal terms, they are, at best, a proxy. 
The Share Centre is also unable to enfranchise investors on a headcount vote, and the terms of 
business make express provision that the nominee reserves the right to not offer the entitlement to 
the investor.114  
These terms make it clear you are not purchasing a share. You receive a beneficial interest only, 
which does not make the investor the “owner”. The contractual rights an investor has are against 
the intermediary, not the company. While it is not a share it is not a bond either, since there is no 
entitlement to a debt.115 At best it is a bad bond, where all the risk is assumed by the investor with 
no guarantee of return and no right in governance. A similar point is made by Salter QC.116 
I also asked friends and family what they thought they were buying when they invested in shares. 
While not an academic or representative study, the common answer amongst the 10 people who 
responded was a “share in the company”. Some thought they “owned” the share, while most 
expected to or expected to have rights against the company. Two respondents simply did not know 
if they owned the shares or not. The respondents reveal a lack of understanding about what is being 
purchased when investing in shares. Some better language in marketing may well clear this up. 
Currently, it is an investment without a name and investors do not get what they should reasonably 
expect. 
The simple solution to this is better regulation, whether self or mandatory, that commits to clear and 
transparent information on what is being purchased. This should be important for fund platforms 
and other intermediaries. While the platforms often stipulate they are providing “execution-only” 
services, leaving the investor outside of the FCA’s regulatory rules on regulated activity117 and 
suitability of investments, the way they describe their products may bring them within those rules. If 
they are inaccurately describing to the potential investor what will be purchased through the 
platform, i.e. that they will being purchasing a share in a company, it could become a “regulated 
activity” that amounts to giving “advice” on “buying” shares if the investor purchases on the 
strength of that information reasonably believing it gives them rights in and against those companies 
the fund invests in. 
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What are the benefits – financial or otherwise – of the current system of intermediation? What 
are the costs or disadvantages – are there any problems beyond those we have highlighted above? 
I believe I have touched on these elsewhere, i.e. expertise of intermediaries and the incentives and 
obligations to maximise the value of the investment. 
There are problems relating to enforcement of rights, potential issues with wealth distribution, 
investor incentive problems with voting rights, problems with incoherent legal development of end 
investors suing those up the chain based on private law obligations. Transparency is also a problem. 
 
Question 27 
What could be the benefits – financial or otherwise – of ensuring the availability of rights and 
remedies to the ultimate investor in an intermediated securities chain? 
Whether passing the rights and remedies to the ultimate investor would improve trust, it is a 
potential benefit. Ensuring they have clear remedies that cover loss, or even going as far as to 
overhaul the law relating to retail investors entirely, would be better than simply passing existing 
rights and remedies to investors. 
The benefit of trust is not one that can be measured but should not be underestimated. While I 
cannot find the source, I recently read how few people invest their money but would do so if they 
could trust the system. BBC Radio 4’s ‘Money Box’ also recently aired a show on investing that 
covered some issues individuals had when it came to investing.118 These included the risk of the 
money “shrinking” or disappearing and not knowing where their money is. It was illuminating 
regarding the common issues people face when deciding whether to invest and when they do. Trust 
has to play a big part in that reducing that risk. Intermediated securities can seem daunting to 
newcomers and novices particularly, as the Money Box podcast identifies, when they are faced with 
significant jargon that is “opaque”. If people are unsure about what they are buying and what will 
happen to their investment or witness events where money is lost with no legal recourse when it 
appears just that there should be, people will not trust the system and will not be willing to take the 
risk. Examples such as London Capital and Finance Plc and Woodford Investment Management will 
be ringing in most potential retail investor’s ears today. This is compounded by the point above 
about the potential for inaccurate description in what investors purchase. This can tie up capital in 
the economy unnecessarily and hinder a potential source of wealth redistribution. 
The industry is also male dominated. A recent podcast reports that only 10% of women felt the 
industry met their needs.119 If control, i.e. legal title and/or the right to move investments from 
companies and funds, is handed over to the individual, that reality may change, similar to what 
social media has done in allowing more voices to be heard. Handing control over to the individual 
may promote diversity and reduce problems associated with group-think, whether internally in the 
organisation or what it does externally. 
 
                                                             
118 BBC Radio 4, Money Box: How do I start investing? Podcast. First aired 18th September 2019 




What could be the costs – financial or otherwise – of ensuring the availability of rights and 
remedies to the ultimate investor in an intermediated securities chain? 
Some of this has already been touched on. Particularly, rights and remedies may be exercised less 
frequently resulting in less scrutiny of corporate actions, or if they are exercised they may not be 
done so to promote the success of the company, whether intentionally or otherwise.  
Passing rights and remedies could also increase the cost of intermediated securities to a point where 
fewer people invest. Measures should be considered whereby intermediaries are incentivised to 
internalise the cost if the market does not naturally drive competition to lower those costs. Also the 
statutory remedy proposed may well reduce transaction costs to off-set potential increased costs in 
passing existing rights and remedies to investors for reasons set out earlier. 
 
END 
 
